Could a resolute cabinet and a more sceptical press have stopped Tony Blair?
How did it happen? Two decades later, it’s easy to say that the invasion of Iraq in March 2003 was a disastrous failure, and there is little point in debating that now. The war remains the most damaging act by any British government since 1945, surpassing even the Suez Crisis of 1956. The Iraq War has come to be seen as what the American strategist George Kennan described as the “seminal catastrophe” of the 20th century, much like the world war of 1914, with its far-reaching consequences shaping the decades that followed.
Not only were the results of the Iraq War devastating, but the justifications for the invasion have also been thoroughly discredited. Even among Tony Blair’s remaining supporters, few can still claim that the case for war was made in good faith. The arguments put forward, primarily the threat of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs) and links between Saddam Hussein and terrorist groups, were later proven to be unfounded. The invasion was based on lies, and the consequences of those lies continue to reverberate in the instability and chaos that followed.
The decision to go to war was driven by Tony Blair’s unshakable belief that he was following the right course, but it also reflected the political dynamics of the time. Blair, then the British Prime Minister, was a steadfast ally of the United States, particularly under President George W. Bush. The UK’s involvement in the Iraq War was in many ways a demonstration of the “special relationship” between the two nations. But Blair’s reliance on the U.S. also meant that he ignored the growing opposition within his own government and the wider public.
A more resolute cabinet could have pushed back against Blair’s war agenda. There were dissenting voices within the British government and military, and some officials, including senior civil servants and intelligence officers, had serious reservations about the validity of the intelligence supporting the war. Had they been more vocal or more united, they might have slowed Blair’s momentum and forced a re-evaluation of the situation.
Similarly, a more skeptical press could have played a crucial role in curbing the rush to war. At the time, much of the British media was complicit in promoting the idea that the invasion was necessary and justified, despite the lack of solid evidence. The media’s role in pushing the narrative of Iraq’s imminent threat was instrumental in gaining public support for the war. A more critical press, willing to question the government’s claims and the integrity of its intelligence, could have challenged Blair’s approach earlier in the process.
Looking back, it is clear that the Iraq War was not an inevitable outcome but rather a series of decisions made by a small group of political elites, in the face of significant opposition from both within the government and the public. While Blair cannot be solely blamed for the war, his leadership and the unquestioning support of key allies were central to its initiation. Had the cabinet shown more independence or the press exercised more scrutiny, the course of history might have been different.
The Iraq War stands as a tragic reminder of the dangers of unchecked power and the importance of transparency and accountability in government decisions. The failure to question the justifications for the war led to a catastrophe that has defined a generation.