The presumption of inevitable war can be self-fulfilling
“With war, if you don’t try it, you can’t know how it will turn out,” said Japanese prime minister Hideki Tojo in 1941, a sentiment that underscores the unpredictable nature of conflict.
When evaluating the decision to go to war, we often rationalize it through a cost/benefit analysis. This process involves weighing the potential benefits of armed conflict against its inevitable costs. Since war comes with high expenses, it is only considered justifiable when the potential gains appear significant enough to outweigh those costs.
In the case of a defensive war, the key consideration is whether the costs avoided—such as the loss of territory, sovereignty, or security—are greater than those endured during the conflict itself.
For Israel, the prospect of a two-front war forces a similar calculation. On one hand, the country seeks to protect its borders and citizens from external threats. On the other, the costs of engaging in a prolonged conflict are considerable, both in terms of human lives and international reputation.
This dilemma is not just theoretical but a practical reality. With growing tensions in the region, the assumption of inevitable war may actually increase the likelihood of it happening. As more actors in the conflict become convinced that war is imminent, actions taken on both sides may lead to an escalation of hostilities.
Thus, the presumption of war can be self-fulfilling. When a country, like Israel, prepares for a potential two-front conflict, its military and political posture may inadvertently provoke the very situation it seeks to avoid. This creates a vicious cycle of action and reaction, where the fear of conflict drives both sides closer to it.
In the end, Israel’s dilemma underscores the complexity of modern warfare: the balance between defensive strategy and the need for diplomacy in preventing escalation.
